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Agency-1962 Tennessee Survey
Edwin R. Render*
I. EXISTENCE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP
I.

II.

SERVANT AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DISTINGUISHED

JURISDICTION DUE TO AcTrvrnEs OF AGENT

I.

EXISTENCE. OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP

Two cases decided during the survey period dealt with the existence
or nonexistence of the agency relationship. While the agency relationship frequently arises out of contract, a contract is not necessary to
the creation of authority in the agent. Consent of the principal is the
basis of the agent's authority.1 Generally, the existence or non2
existence of the agency relationship is a question of fact for the jury;
but in the two cases to be discussed, Tennessee appellate courts
reversed jury verdicts on the ground that there was no competent
evidence in the record to support their findings.
In the case of Cutshaw v. Randilesa the plaintiff was injured by the
negligent operation of an automobile which was owned by the
defendant and was being driven by his son. Approximately one week
prior to the accident the defendant was hospitalized in Knoxville.
Upon being hospitalized the defendant asked his son, who was more
than twenty-one years of age, and his son's wife to stay at his home
in Blount County with the defendant's wife and minor daughters until
he returned. The son and his wife agreed. On the day of the accident
the son drove his wife to work in the defendanfs car, and the accident
occurred shortly after the wife was left at her place of employment.
The uncontradicted proof was that the defendant had not given the
son permission to use his car and that the son had not so used the
car on previous occasions. The Court of Appeals for the Eastern Section reversed a jury's verdict for the plaintiff and dismissed the action.
The plaintiff's theory was that the son was engaged in doing something the father might have been doing for his wife and daughters
had he not been confined to the -hospital. That is, the son was the
agent of the defendant, acting within the scope of his employment
*Legal Department, Atomic Energy Commission, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
OuTrINEs OF AGENYc § 23 (4th ed. 1952).
2. See Conaway v. New York Life Ins. Co., 171 Tenn. 290, 102 S.W.2d 66 (1936);
Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283, 109 S.W.2d 417 (E.S. 1937).
3. 357 S.W.2d 628 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
1. MEcHEm,
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at the time of the accident.
The plaintiff relied on the well-established rule that the agency
relationship may be inferred from proven circumstances, and if this
inference can reasonably be drawn it becomes evidence of agency
even though opposed by other credible evidence. 4 The court said,
however, that this rule was inapplicable in the case of the statutory
presumption of agency arising from proof of ownership and registration of an automobile.5 The court cited and distinguished Bell Cab
& U-Drive It Co. v. Sloan6 on the basis of its facts, observing that
in the Sloan case the driver was a regular employee of the defendant.
The court in the instant case holds that the statutory presumption
does not necessarily make a case for the jury when the defendant
offers proof that no agency relationship existed or that the vehicle
was not being used within the scope of employment. If the proof is
overwhelmingly in the defendant's favor, so much so that reasonable
minds could not differ, then a verdict should be directed for the
defendant. The cases from other jurisdictions are divided on this
point; the other view being that the defendant's evidence is always
for the jury, and once the basic facts are proved a directed verdict
for the defendant is always improper.' The position taken in the
instant case seems sound in that it does not frustrate the purpose of
the statute; 8 it is consistent with previous Tennessee authority; 9 and
4. Boillin-Harrison Co. v. Lewis & Co., 182 Tenn. 342, 187 S.W.2d 17 (1945);
Kenner v. City Nat'l Bank, 164 Tenn. 119, 46 S.W.2d 46 (1932); Rich Printing Co.
v. Estate of McKellar, 46 Tenn. App. 444, 330 S.W.2d 361 (W.S. 1959); Rural Educ.
Ass'n v. Bush, 42 Tenn. App. 34, 298 S.W.2d 761 (M.S. 1956); Morgan, Procedure
and Evidence-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. Rzv. 1197, 1204 (1960); O'Neal,
Agency-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REv. 973 (1957); Seavey, Agency-1960
Tennessee Survey, 13 V~m. L. Rv. 987, 990 (1960).
5. This statute provides: "In all actions for injury to persons and/or to property
caused by the negligent operation or use of any automobile, auto, truck, motorcycle, or
other motor propelled vehicle within this state, proof of ownership for such vehicles, shall
be prima facie evidence that said vehicle at the time of the cause of action sued on
was being operated and used with the authority, consent and knowledge of the owner
in the very transaction out of which said injury or cause of action arose, and such
proof of ownership likewise shall be prima facie evidence that said vehicle was then
and there being operated by the owner, or by the owner's servant for the owner's
use and benefit and within the course and scope of his employment. This section is in
the nature of remedial legislation, and it is the legislative intent that it be given a
liberal construction." TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1037 (Supp. 1962).
6. 93 Tenn. 352, 246 S.W.2d 41 (1952). In this case the proven circumstances from
which the fact of agency was inferred by the jury were: (1) that the driver of the car
was employed by defendant as a taxi driver; (2) that he was wearing his uniform at
the time of the accident; and (3) that someone else, supposedly a passenger, was
alleged to have been in the car at the time of the accident. There was also credible
evidence that the driver was using the cab on private business at the time of the
accident. For a thorough discussion of the effect of presumptions in Tennessee, see
Note, 10 VAND.L. REv. 563 (1957).
7. MEcOJm, OUTLINES OF AGENcY § 478 (4th ed. 1952).
8. The philosophy of such statutes has been stated in these terms: "[Ilf we consider the relative facility of proof as between the parties, the ordinary habits of
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it prevents abuse of the presumption.Y
In Heywood Feed Ingredients,Inc. v. State," the State of Tennessee
suffered damage when an overloaded truck broke down a bridge on

a public highway. The main issue was whether Clark, the driver of
the truck, was an agent of the defendant corporation's predecessor at
the time of the accident. For several years prior to the accident the
corporation of Heywood and Rabb, Inc., had been engaged in the

business of buying and selling grain. Heywood and Rabb were the
only stockholders in the corporation. In August of 1957, Clark leased
his truck and personal services to the corporation. On October 2,
1957, a creditors' committee, with Heywood acting as liquidating
agent, took over the assets of the corporation for purposes of liquidation. Within a few days Rabb went into business individually under

the name of Rabb Feed and Grain Company and utilized Clark's
services. Heywood testified that the corporation of Heywood and
Rabb, Inc., did no business between October 2, 1957, and May 1,
1958. He further testified that he purchased all of Rabb's stock in
Heywood and Rabb, Inc., amended the name of the company to

Heywood Feed Ingredients, Inc., and went back into business in May
of 1958.

According to Heywood's testimony, neither the original

corporation nor its successor was in business on October 25, 1957, the
date of the accident. Clark testified that his lease agreement with
Heywood and Rabb, Inc., was terminated when that corporation went
into liquidation, and that shortly thereafter he was hired by Rabb.

A lease dated October 4, 1958, and notarized January 4, 1958, was
introduced in support of this position.
A few days before the accident, Rabb sent Clark to Tampa, Florida,
in order to haul a load of phosphate from Tampa to East St. Louis,
owners of vehicles, and the un-wisdom of placing the risk of not obtaining evidence
upon the person who owns a valuable and dangerous apparatus and therefore should
take special precautions against its misuse by irresponsible persons. The reckless
irresponsibility of many motorists, their notorious selfishness in monopolizing the highway against pedestrians, and the prevalence of homicide by motorists who set no value
on the lives of others in comparison with their own convenience,-all these modem
facts demand that the present rule, and every other applicable rule, be employed to
improve the standard of care obeyed by vehicle-owners." 9 WiGMoRE, EVDENCE §
2510a (3d ed. 1940).
9. In Moore v. Union Chevrolet Co., 46 Tenn. App. 206, 326 S.W.2d 855 (W.S.
1958), a directed verdict for the defendant was upheld.
10. When the judge fails to take the case from the jury when the defendant offers
plausible and uncontradicted proof that no agency relationship existed or that the
agent was acting outside the scope of the employment, it can amount to the imposition
of absolute liability on the owners of motor vehicles. See General Foods Corp. v.
Coney, 35 Ala. App. 492, 48 So. 2d 781 (1950); Arrigo v. Lindquist, 324 Mass. 278,
85 N.E.2d 782 (1949); Miller v. Service & Sales, Inc., 149 Ore. 11, 38 P.2d 995
(1934); Steiner v. Royal Blue Cab Co., 172 Wash. 396, 20 P.2d 39 (1933); Bushnell
v. Yoshika Tashiro, 115 Cal. App. 563, 2 P.2d 550 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931). This view
is roundly criticized in MEcHEM, Ournim oF AGENCY § 479 (1952).
11. 356 S.W.2d 605 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
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Illinois. After unloading his truck in East St. Louis, Clark telephoned
Rabb for instructions but was unable to contact him. Heywood was
contacted and advised Clark to consult a broker in St. Louis and not
to return with an empty truck if it could be avoided. A cargo was
obtained and while hauling this merchandise, the accident occurred.
Heywood did not contradict Clark in any material matters, and he
insisted that when he gave the instructions to Clark that he did so as
a volunteer, and not as Clark's employer or as an officer of Heywood
and Rabb, Inc.
The state's theory was that Clark's testimony was sufficiently impeached by the discrepancy between the oral testimony and the
written date on the lease agreement between him and Rabb so as to
justify submitting the case to the jury. According to the state, the
issue was whether the agency relation between Heywood and Rabb,
Inc., and Clark had been terminated prior to the accident.1 2 The
court of appeals held that there was no substantial evidence in the
record to support a finding that Clark was acting as an agent of
either Heywood and Rabb, Inc., or Heywood Feed Ingredients, Inc.,
at the time of the accident. Even if Clark's testimony were completely
discredited by the above-mentioned discrepancy, the only evidence
remaining in the record was that Heywood and Rabb, Inc., was not
in business at the time of the accident and that Heywood was acting
as a mere volunteer in advising Clark. Furthermore, the testimony of
Clark would not be discredited if the discrepancy in dates were the
result of an oversight. Given the fact that the state had the burden
of proving that Clark was acting as the agent of Heywood and Rabb,
Inc., at the time of the accident, it is difficult to see how the court
could have done anything but find that no agency relationship
existed. 13
II.

SERVANT AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DISTINGUISHED

The other two cases to be discussed in this article are concerned
with the vexatious and recurring problem of distinguishing between
agents and independent contractors. The Restatement of Agency
recognizes that the master-servant relationship does not lend itself
to exact definition, and it sets forth several factors to consider in
determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor:
12. For general discussions of the means of terminating the authority of the agent,
including the bankruptcy of the principal, see FERSON, PRINCIPLF_S OF Acm'cy §§ 187200 (1954); MEuCHE,
OuTLInES OF AGENcY §§ 256-91 (4th ed. 1952).

13. Cobble v. Langford, 190 Tenn. 385, 230 S.W.2d 194 (1949); Rich Printing Co.
v. MeKellar's Estate, 46 Tenn. App. 444, 330 S.W.2d 361 (W.S. 1959): Rural Educ.
Ass'n v. Bush, 42 Tenn. App. 34 (M.S. 1956).
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(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the
skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or
the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place to work for
the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person
is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job; (h)
whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe that they are creating the relationship
of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 14

The basic problem in F. Perlman & Co. v. Gillian 5 was to determine who was the master of a negligent truck driver. In arriving at
this determination the court also felt constrained to discuss the nature
of the distinction between the principal-agent relationship and that of
independent contractor-contractee. The facts of the case were essentially these. Perlman needed access to trucks and drivers to haul cans
from an arsenal at Milan to Memphis. A representative of Perlman
entered an oral agreement with Waddell Brothers to utilize Waddell's
truck and driver. Yarbro, the driver, while hauling a load of cans
from Milan to Memphis negligently injured the plaintiff, who brought
actions against Perlman, Waddell, and Yarbro. The plaintiff took a
nonsuit in the action against Waddell, verdicts were directed for some
other defendants, and the plaintiff received a favorable verdict as
against Perlman and Yarbro. Inasmuch as a nonsuit was taken with
respect to Waddell, the plaintiff's theory was either (1) that Yarbro
was the servant of Perlman; or (2) that the relationship among the
defendants was that of principal, agent, and subagent. Perlman
contended that Waddell was an independent contractor and that
Yarbro was Waddell's servant; while Waddell, prior to the nonsuit,
contended that it had leased the truck and driver to Perman and
that at the time of the accident Yarbro, the driver, was Perlman's
agent or servant. Whether the agreement between Perlman and
Waddell created a principal-agent relationship or an independent
contractor-contractee relationship as between them was the narrow
question for determination, according to the court.
Several facets of the relationship tended to support the conclusion
that the enterprise was that of Perman and that the relationship
between it and Waddell was that of principal and agent. Waddell
leased the truck to Perman and had painted a sign on it so stating.
14. O'Neal, Agency-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REv. 918, 919-20 (1956);
(SEcoND), AGENcY § 220(2) (1958) and Explanatory Notes thereto.

RESTATEmEmT

15. 355 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
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The bills of lading for cans hauled showed that they were consigned
to Perlman. Neither Waddell nor Yarbro had permits to enter the
arsenal; Perlman had the only permit. The fact that no cans were
hauled except on specific instructions from Perlman tended to support
the view that Perlman retained the right to control the details of the
work. Perlman attempted to show that the enterprise was that of
Waddell by proving that Waddell owned and maintained the truck
in question and that Waddell was regularly engaged in the trucking
business. Furthermore, Waddell paid the wages of the driver. Perlman tried to show that the control over the details of the work was
in Waddell by proving that Waddell decided which trucks were to
be used, the driver thereof, and the route to be taken. The method by
which Waddell was paid was alleged by Perlman to tend toward
the relationship of independent contractor-contractee.
In holding that Waddell was the agent of Perlman and not an
independent contractor, the court relied on two well-settled concepts
of agency law. First, the court cited earlier Tennessee authority
which stated that the retention of the right to terminate the employment at any time is incompatible with the control over the details of
the work which the independent contractor usually enjoys. 6 The
court thought that the agreement between Perlman and Waddell was
terminable on notice and that this strongly militated toward the
finding of a principal-agency relationship. Second, the question of
whether one is an agent or an independent contractor is a question
of fact for the jury, and the risk of non-persuasion is upon the party
asserting the existence of the independent contractor relationshipPerlman in this instance. In the instant case the jury had found
Waddell to be Perlman's agent, and the trial court gave its approval
to the jury's verdict. The appellate court felt constrained to uphold
the verdict if any competent evidence to support it could be found
in the record. The trial court was affirmed on this basis. 1
The court's analysis of the nature of the legal relationship existing
between Perlman and Yarbro is unclear. Although the parties and
16. The supreme court in Odom v. Sanford & Treadway, 156 Tenn. 202, 210, 299
S.W. 1045 (1927) relied on the following from 14 R.C.L. Independent Contractors §
9: "The power of an employer to terminate the employment at any time is incompatible
with the full control of the work which is usually enjoyed by an independent contractor,
and hence is considered as a strong circumstance tending to show the subserviency of
the employee. Indeed, it has been said that no single fact is more conclusive, perhaps,
than the unrestricted right of the employer to end the particular service whenever he
chooses, without regard to the final result of the work itself. On the other hand, the
fact that the employer cannot terminate the employment strongly tends to show that
the contractor is independent." See Income Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 168 Tenn. 471,
79 S.W.2d 572 (1935).
17. Ely v. Rice Bros., 26 Tenn. App. 19, 167 S.W.2d 355 (E.S. 1942); Tennessee
Valley Appliances, Inc. v. Rowden, 24 Tenn. App. 487, 146 S.W.2d 845 (M.S. 1940);
Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283, 109 S.W.2d 417 (E.S. 1937).
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the court referred to Yarbro as an agent or servant, the context in
which these words were used indicate that Yarbro may have been
a subagent as that term is used in the Restatement of Agency. 8 If
Waddell was hired as an agent with the power to act either through
himself or through another, and Yarbro was acting on behalf of both
Perlman and Waddell at the time of the accident, the relationship of
principal, agent, and subagent would seem to have existed. 19 On the
other hand, if Waddell, either acting as Perlman's agent, or as an
independent contractor, hired Yarbro to act solely on behalf of
Perlman, then Yarbro was Perlman's agent, not a subagent. If the
latter set of relationships existed, then the relationship between
Perlman and Waddell becomes irrelevant inasmuch as Perlman could
have engaged independent contractors to hire servants for him.

III.

JURISDICTION DUE TO AcTr rEs OF AGENT

Fisher v. Trion, Inc.,2 0 was an action against a foreign corporation
to recover damages caused by the malfunction of the corporation's
products. The defendant-Trion-was organized under the laws of
Pennsylvania and marketed its products in Tennessee through an
"independent manufacturer's representative," Rogers, a Tennessee
resident. Rogers maintained a place of business in Knoxville, where
he sold the products of several manufacturers, on a commission basis.
The plaintiffs, who were stockholders in the defendant corporation,
inquired about the purchase of an electronic air cleaner, and the
defendant referred them to Rogers. Trion advised Rogers of this
inquiry. Rogers called on plaintiff and a sale was consummated. Subsequently the air cleaner caught fire, causing damage to plaintiff's
property. Summons was served on Rogers as Trion's resident agent
in Knox County, Tennessee.
The basic issue was whether Trion was doing business in Tennessee
within the meaning of sections 20-220 and 20-221 of the Tennessee
Code Annotated so as to be subject to service of process 2 ' Agency
18. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), AGExcY § 5 (1958). The relationship of principal,
agent, and subagent is created "when an agent agrees with his principal that he will
accomplish a result for the principal, but for this purpose he will use agents of his own
selection to whom he pays compensation and for whose conduct he is responsible to the
principal." Seavey, Subagents and Subservants, 68 HAzv. L. REv. 658, 660 (1955).
19. "[Ilf the appointing agent is to perform an act, and may do so either by himself
or through another, and the appointee of the agent is doing the act both on account
of the principal and as agent of the appointing agent, then the appointee is properly
designated a subagent." Roberts, Agency-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REV.
1064, 1074 (1959).
20. 353 S.W.2d 406 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
21. Pertinent statutes provide: "Any corporation claiming existence under the laws
of the United States or any other state ... or any business trust found doing business
in this state, shall be subject to suit here to the same extent that corporations of this
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law-whether Rogers was an independent contractor or an agent of
Trion-becomes relevant because of its bearing on the question of
whether Trion was doing business in Tennessee.
The basis of the relationship between Trion and Rogers was a
contract, termed a "Manufacturer's Representative Agreement." The
contract provided that all orders would be made out to Trion and
sent to Trion for acceptance. Trion carried the customer's accounts.
Rogers maintained a place of business in Knoxville, furnished his own
facilities, paid his own expenses and received compensation in the
form of commissions based on net sales. Trion interfered little in the
details of Rogers' work. Finally, the contract provided that Rogers
was an independent contractor, not an employee of Trion and that
Rogers was not "the agent or legal representative of Trion, Inc., for
any purpose whatsoever."22
Under these circumstances, the court could do little but find that
Rogers was an independent contractor. The interference with the
details of Rogers' work by Trion is negligible, although it is arguable
that Trion did possess the right to control the details of Rogers' work
by virtue of the method of financing sales and the retention of the
right to reject orders. It would seem that their relationship met the
other Restatement criteria, inasmuch as Rogers was probably engaged
in a "distinct occupation." The kind of work Rogers was doing is
generally done by a "specialist without supervision." Clearly some
degree of skill and managerial ability was required of Rogers. He
worked in his own building. Payment to Rogers for goods sold on a
commission basis seems more nearly akin to payment for a job done
than payment by the hour. The parties clearly did not regard the
state are by the laws thereof liable to be sued, so far as relates to any transaction had,
in whole or in part, within this state, or any cause of action arising here, but not
otherwise. Any such corporation or trust having any transaction with persons, or
having any transaction concerning any property situated in this state, through any
agency whatever, acting for it within the state, shall be held to be doing business
here within the meaning of this section." Tm;N. CoDE ANN. § 20-220 (1956). "Process
may be served upon any agent of said corporation or trust found within the county
where the suit is brought, no matter what character of agent such person may be; and,
in the absence of such an agent, it shall be sufficient to serve process upon any person,
if found within the county where the suit is brought, who represented the corporation
at the time the transaction out of which the suit arises took place, or, if the agency
through which the agency was had, be itself a corporation or business trust, then upon
any agent of that corporation or trust upon whom process might have been served
if it were the defendant." TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-221 (1956).
22. 353 S.W.2d at 408.
23. The Tennessee courts have tended to give substantial weight to the right to
control the details of the work in distinguishing between agents and independent contractors. For example, in National Cash Register Co. v. Leach, 3 Tenn. App. 411,
416 (E.S. 1926), the Court of Appeals for the Eastern Section said: "The real test of
the relationship of principal and agent and that of independent contractor is, does
the employer exercise a right of control over the employee in the performance of tho
work, and not as to the result of the completed work"?
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relationship created by the contract as a principal-agency relationship.
Thus, the court's conclusion that Rogers was an independent contractor and not the agent of Trion is in accord with the Restatement
and Tennessee precedent. 24
The court seemed to assume that if Rogers was an independent
contractor rather than Trion's agent, it would follow that Trion was
not doing business in Tennessee. Indeed, both parties seemed to have

made the same assumption.25 Although the court faithfully followed

earlier Tennessee cases 26 and aligned itself with the vast majority of
decisions from other jurisdictions involving this point,. it lays itself
open to the criticism of having applied rules of law in a mechanical

manner so as to defeat the purpose of the statute.28 Furthermore, the

result reached seems unnecessary in view of the wording of the

statute.
The problem of distinguishing between agents and independent
contractors for purposes of determining the applicability of social
legislation has indeed been difficult.2 It is quite proper, according to
present juristic thought, for courts to make such distinctions only in
light of the purpose of such statutes. 30 This statute was enacted for
the purpose of obtaining service of process on corporations which
were not subject to service under previous law. It was designed to

expand the competency of the Tennessee courts. 31 Thus if the court
24. See also FERSoN,

PRINCIPLES OF AcENcY §

39 (1954);

MECaEM, OUTLINEs OF

AcENcY §§ 427-31 (4th ed. 1952).

25. The essence of appellants proposition number three in its brief in the court of
appeals was that Rogers was acting as the agent of Trion. Factors such as Trion's
right to make direct sales, control over certain promotional activities, the requirement
that Rogers inspect equipment and furnish one day service to customers, and
maintain a listing in the local telephone directory were all relied on in support of
Fisher's position that Rogers was Trion's agent in the Restatement sense. Brief for
Appellant, pp. 14-18, Fisher v. Trion, Inc., 353 S.W.2d 406 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
One proposition in the brief for appellee was that Rogers was not Trion's agent.
It was argued that "the proof does not support a conclusion that Rogers is an agent
of Trion upon whom service of process may be had under the statutes." Counsel then
made the point that Rogers only had authority to solicit orders but not to finalize sales.
Brief for Appellee, pp. 7-8, Fisher v. Trion, Inc., 353 S.W.2d 406 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1961).
26. Tucker v. International Salt Co., 209 Tenn. 95, 349 S.W.2d 541 (1960); Banks
Grocery Co. v. Kelley-Clarke Co., 146 Tenn. 579, 243 S.W. 879 (1922); Denson v.
Webb, 23 Tenn. App. 599, 136 S.W.2d 59 (W.S. 1938).
27. 23 Am. JuR. Foreign Corporations § 376 (1939).
28. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. REy. 605 (1908).
29. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (pts. 1-2), 38 YALE L.J.
584, 720 (1928); Jacobs, Are Independent Contractors Really Independent?, 3 DE
PAUL L. REv. 23 (1953); Steffen, Independent Contractorand the Good Life, 2 U. Cm.
L. REv. 501 (1935).
30. STONE, THE PnovNrcE AND FUNCTiON OF LAw 149 (1946).
31. In Telephone Co. v. Turner, 88 Tenn. 266, 269, 12 S.W. 544 (1889), the court
said that the statute in question "enlarges the Code provisions, and is not a limitation."
See also Thach v. Continental Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 114 Tenn. 271, 87 S.W. 255
(1904); Guthrie v. Indemnity Ass'n, 101 Tenn. 643, 49 S.W. 829 (1899).
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felt constrained to distinguish between agents and independent contractors, it should have done so only with the purpose of the statute
clearly in mind.
The decision fails to take modern marketing methods into account,
with the result that words which were intended to enhance the
jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts are used by this court to limit its
jurisdiction. When the statute was enacted in 1887, the agent was
commonly used as a marketing vehicle. In order to reach sellers of
defective products, the legislature provided for service of process
upon any agent of the foreign corporation or "upon any person, if
found within the county where suit is brought, who represented the
corporation at the time the transaction out of which the suit arises
took place." The effect of this statute can be avoided by the use of
independent contractors as a marketing mechanism. When this
happens words such as "agent," "agency," and "represented the seller"
become words limiting competence rather than words used to expand
the power of the Tennessee courts. Thus, in the instant case the
court applies the very words which were intended to expand the
court's competence in such a manner so as to limit it.
Finally, a few courts are taking the view that a finding that the
local merchant was the agent of the foreign corporation is not required by such statutes. 33 These courts recognize that foreign corporations can "do business" in a state through independent contractors,
and that under present marketing practices many independent contractors can be mere conduits in the marketing process.14 Such a view
seems tenable under the wording of the Tennessee statute. It would
involve holding that the words "agent," and "agency," are not used
in their technical sense, but rather that a phrase like "through any
agency whatever" means through any instrumentality, vehicle or
medium whatever.
32. For a decision under prior law see The Chicago & A.R.R. v. Walker, 77 Tenn. 475
(1882).
33. See Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 2d 490, 244 P.2d 968 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1952), cert. denied, Westwood Pharmacal Corp. v. Fielding, 344 U.S. 897 (1952).
This New York corporation marketed its goods in California in much the same manner
as did Trion, through a distributor who "ran his business entirely on his own." In the
California case, as in the instant case, the basic issue was whether the foreign corporation was doing business in California. However, the California court refused to
allow the agency law distinction between agents and independent contractors to be
controlling on the issue of whether the foreign corporation was doing business in
California. "The technical distinction between an independent contractor and an agent
is, for this purpose at least, immaterial, except as it may be evidence one way or the
other." 244 P.2d at 970.
34. That corporations can do business through independent contractors is implicit in
the following dicta from W. H. Elliot & Sons v. E. & F. King & Co., 144 F. Supp.
401, 406 (D.N.H. 1956): "I believe the fact that Litter was a separate and independent corporation and not an 'agent' of Nuodex, in the legal sense, is not a bar
to service of process upon Nuodex in New Hampshire." See also Dettman v. Nelson
Testor Co., 7 Wis. 2d 6, 95 N.W.2d 804 (1959), wherein similar views are expressed.

